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This book is a sophisticated defense of what is now often called “type-B-materialism” a position 
that combines conceptual dualism with ontological monism. It grants the dualist that there are no a 
priori conceptual links between our mental and our physical vocabularies. What it does not grant is 
the inference from a conceptual dichotomy to an ontological dualism. Thus, since it is not the case 
that all truths expressed in physical terms imply a priori the truths expressed in mental terms, the 
widely  discussed  anti-materialist  thought  experiments  are  not  entirely  misconceived.  Mary,  a 
scientist in a black-and-white world cannot infer color-related phenomenal truths from the complete 
knowledge of the relevant physical truths, and physical duplicates of humans without phenomenal 
experience (metaphysical zombies) are conceivable. This epistemic gap, however, does not, says 
Papineau, imply an ontological gap. At the level of ontology a physicalist monism is to be upheld 
since a psycho-physical identity theory is, according to Papineau, the only way to all allow for a  
theory  of  mental  causation  that  is  consistent  with  contemporary  science,  the  completeness  of 
physics, and the causal closure of the physical realm. After all, “two” entities that ;are' identical  
cannot compete for causal efficacy.
This basic argument for materialism is developed in the first chapter of the book. It is however, only 
setting the stage for the central argument of the book, according to which, the epistemic gap is not  
caused by non-physical features of consciousness but stems from unique features of our concepts of  
consciousness.  Although these concepts refer only to physical properties,  their  unique character 
creates  the illusion of referring to  non-physical properties.  Papineau is  not  the only physicalist 
making this move. It has become quite popular because the “classical” type-B-materialist strategy 
of paralleling a posteriori psycho-physical identities to a posteriori scientific identities of the form 
“water  = H2O” has become less  and less  plausible.  Kripke argued that  the  contingency of  the 
psycho-physical relation is of a different and more robust kind. It really does not make sense to 
argue that something that has all the phenomenal properties of pain really is not pain because it is 
not type-identical to certain physical properties. What feels like pain is pain. The same cannot be 
said  about  water.  Later,  Chalmers's  “two-dimensional  semantics”  gave  a  much  more  complete 
explanation of why a posteriori identifications in the sciences cannot serve as the model for psycho-
physical identity theories. Thus the type-B-materialist has to accept that psycho-physical identities 
remain  inexplicable  (“gappy  identities”).  The  strong  modal  tie  between  mental  and  physical 
properties is brute in the sense that this necessity is not epistemically obvious to us. It has to be 
accepted  as  a  brute  metaphysical  fact.  There  is  a  gap  between  human  concept  formation  and 
rationality, on the one hand, and what is real on the other. This is our epistemic situation with regard 
to the mind-body problem. 
A major challenge for this account is this. As a form of physicalism it needs to provide a physicalist 
explanation for our epistemological situation. In this book Papineau tries to provide an analysis of 
certain features of conscious beings like us that explains our unique epistemic situation with respect 
to  consciousness,  The key question,  however,  remains:  Is  this  account  ultimately  explicable  in 
physical terms? If not, how can it save materialism? 
Before this question can be addressed,  a very brief outline of Papineau's theory of phenomenal 
concepts needs to be given. The basic intuition is that we refer to a certain experience by producing 
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an  example  of  it.  This  is  called  the  “quotational  model.”  As  Papineau  explains  it,  “Ordinary 
quotation marks can be viewed as forming a frame, which, when filled by a word, yields a term for  
that word. Similarly, my phenomenal concepts involve a frame ... and, when this frame is filled by 
an experience, the whole then refers to that experience” (p. 117). This model neatly explains why 
phenomenal concepts resemble the conscious properties to which they refer. Most other concepts 
don't involve the things to which they refer. When we deploy a phenomenal concept, however, “we 
activate a 'faint copy' of the experience referred to” (p. 170). This offers a natural account of the  
dualist intuition that conscious experiences cannot be identical with material states. It seems to us 
that phenomenal concepts, being so uniquely different, cannot refer to material properties and that 
physical concepts  cannot refer  to  phenomenal  properties.  Papineau argues that this inference is 
fallacious. We cannot infer a difference of properties from a difference in concept use and concept 
formation. 
One problem with this analysis can easily be stated. According to the type-B-materialist zombies 
are conceivable. Since the physical facts determine all the facts, zombies (which are, by definition, 
physically indistinguishable from us) must be exactly in the same epistemic situation with regard to 
phenomenal concepts as we are. By applying a phenomenal concept they activate a faint copy of the 
appropriate experience. The trouble is that, by definition, they lack experiences. Imagine a zombie-
twin of Mary. Does Zombie-Mary acquire phenomenal concepts in the same way we do when she 
leaves the black and white laboratory? That does not seem to be the case. So, if our epistemic 
situation  with  regard  to  phenomenal  concepts  is  different  from the  zombie's  situation  and  the 
zombie is physically indistinguishable from us, then whatever accounts for our epistemic situation 
with regard to phenomenal concepts is not entirely physical. 
In other words, it is unclear how something entirely physical can account for the special epistemic 
characteristics  of  phenomenal  concept  use  and acquisition described by Papineau.  'There  is  an 
explanatory gap between physical properties and phenomenal concepts. It is hard for the type-B-
materialist  to  bridge  this  gap  because  this  type  of  materialism opens  up a  chasm between the 
conceptual  and  the  ontological  realms.  If  we  cannot  infer  from  a  conceptual  difference  to  an 
ontological difference, then it is hard to see how any analysis of phenomenal concepts could by 
itself support a robust ontological thesis. Something more is needed than analysis of concept use 
and acquisition. The account would be ontologically robust if all differences in our conceptual-
epistemic situation supervened on physical properties. But if this were the case, zombies would be 
inconceivable.  Their conceptual-epistemic situation is different from ours, even though they are 
physically  indistinguishable.  So,  if  my  analysis  is  correct,  it  seems  that  for  his  account  of 
phenomenal concepts to work, Papineau ought to give up his type-B-materialism. 
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